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Land sovereignty
1. Land sovereignty is the right of working peoples to have effective access to, use of, and control 
over land and the benefits of its use and occupation, where land is understood as resource, 
territory, and landscape.
2.  Land sovereignty is both a call to action against a renewed corporate and (trans)national global 
push to enclose the commons and an assertion of the need for a people’s enclosure of the land; 
supporting working peoples and their human right to control over land.
3.  Land sovereignty goes beyond viewing land just as a resource to also considering land as territory 
and as landscapes. This embraces struggles by indigenous movements, rural labourers, urban 
activists and social movements North and South who have sometimes been excluded by traditional 
land reform campaigns.
4.  Land sovereignty embraces plural understanding of property rights -  encompassing communal, 
community, state, and/or private property rights – privileging the commons without romanticising 
it; recognising the importance of state property while confronting the contradictory role of state in 
land conflicts. 
5.  Land sovereignty builds on redistributive land reform, looking to go beyond it by supporting 
land restitution for people who previously benefited from land reform have been displaced and 
dispossessed in more recent land grabs and by supporting other land policies whose redistributive 
content can be shaped through mass struggles: e.g. forest land reallocation policies, community-
based forest management, tenure reform and leasehold reform.
6.  Land sovereignty connects with the popular demand and movements for food sovereignty allowing 
for a mutually reinforcing, synergistic interaction between them.
2Global context 
A convergence of global crises (financial, environmental, 
energy, food prices) in recent years has contributed to a 
dramatic revaluation of, and rush to control land and other 
resources such as water. The convergence of ‘peak oil’ 
concerns, climate change (with industrial agriculture and the 
transport sector combined probably contributing to more than 
half of greenhouse gas emissions), and persistent hunger 
(affecting one billion people in 2010) have combined with 
capital’s need for continuous expanded accumulation. For 
mainstream economists, there is a lifeline: newly discovered 
‘reserve agricultural land’ mainly in the South (World Bank 
2010), estimated to amount to between 445 million and 1.7 
billion hectares (Deininger 2011). In their view this represents 
land that can be transformed into new zones of investment 
for food, animal feed, and fuel production.
Greatly encouraged by such extravagant claims by technical 
‘experts’, transnational and national economic actors from 
various business sectors such as oil and auto, mining and 
forestry, food, chemical and bioenergy are acquiring or 
eyeing large swathes of land on which to establish or extend 
large-scale extractive and agro-industrial enterprises. Initially 
seen to be limited mainly to the South, there is growing 
evidence that the trend is happening also in the North and 
in virtually all global regions and continents as well. Many of 
these deals are driven by transnational corporations (TNC), 
and in some cases are foreign government-driven, but almost 
always in close partnership (or collusion) with national 
governments. In some cases, national governments are 
actively shopping around for possible big investors.
The narratives justifying this cycle of land grabbing have been 
changing too. There has been a clear shift in mainstream 
development discourse, from alarm over global land grabbing 
to acceptance of it. Acceptance is founded on the assumption 
Introduction
Dramatic changes around food, climate, energy, and finance 
in recent years have pushed questions of land use and land 
control back onto the centre stage of development discourse, 
at the very moment when the same conditions are spurring 
an unprecedented rush for land and water across the globe.2 
Although it is often overlooked, water also figures heavily in 
this new cycle of resource-grabbing, both as a driver of land 
grabbing for industrial agriculture, and as a target itself, as 
in the case of water-grabbing for hydropower or hydraulic 
fracturing (aka ‘fracking’), for example.3 A fusion of the 
industrial agro-food and energy complexes has made land 
and water key resources in the global capitalist system again, 
fuelling in turn a huge renewed process of enclosure known 
as the ‘global land grab’.
There is a need to come to grips with land issues in a 
changing global context and to rethink what may be needed 
to mobilise effectively in such a setting. The main frameworks 
of advocacy that have been employed by some academics, 
radical researchers and social movement activists have 
some particular limitations in the context of global land 
grabbing. Neither land reform nor land tenure security alone 
are well-equipped to be frameworks for analysis or action 
in the current conjuncture. Land reform remains important, 
but its limitations as a call to action are being exposed by 
the current cycle of land grabbing. Likewise, land tenure 
security is important, but alone is not enough, since adverse 
incorporation of the rural working poor classes into the 
corporate-controlled global food-feed-fuel regime does not 
necessarily require moving them off the land. 
If, as our analysis suggests, there is a need to transition the 
people’s demand for land from ‘land reform’ and ‘land tenure 
security’ to something else, then ‘land sovereignty’ as a 
framework is worth considering.
1  Borras is Associate Professor of Rural Development Studies at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague, Netherlands and a Fellow 
of the Transnational Institute (TNI). Franco is a researcher in the Agrarian Justice Programme  at the TNI in Amsterdam. Both are adjunct faculty at the 
College of Humanities and Development of the China Agricultural University in Beijing.
2  We have written this conversational essay, with land sovereignty cast in normative terms, less as academics than as activists. It is part of our political 
journey together with so many comrades from since many years ago. It is a continuing conversation with fellow activists in trying to make sense of the 
challenges confronting the agrarian front, and how to reposition radical social movements in the emerging realignment of global state and social forces.  
As a conversational essay, it is rough in many edges, tentative in many parts. Many of the ideas here build on our previous works. It is therefore suggested 
to the reader to refer to three other related papers we have jointly authored, namely, Borras and Franco (2010a), (2010b) and (2010c). Several parts of this 
current paper draw from these three related papers of ours.
3  See Mehta, Veldwisch and Franco 2012; and Kay and Franco 2012.
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that the ongoing rural crisis  of persistent chronic poverty 
and widespread hunger is at base a crisis of investment 
(e.g., a lack thereof). According to this view, the current 
upswing of big-investor interest in land presents a must-
seize opportunity to address this situation. In terms of 
strategy, this narrative manufactures a ‘need’ for ‘multiple 
stakeholders’ to agree on basic principles of ‘responsibility’ 
in order to create ‘win-win-win’ scenarios for all involved 
in land transactions and investments. This re-framing of the 
problem of land grabbing is captured by IFPRI’s (International 
Food Policy Research Institute’s) call for a code of conduct in 
late 2009 as the means to ‘make virtue out of necessity’, and 
is reflected in the World Bank’s Principles for Responsible 
Agricultural Investment or RAI Principles.
The starting point of RAI is a particular vision of successful 
national capitalist economic development, where what is at 
issue is not a land problem but an investment problem, and 
so more large-scale ‘investment’ is considered the solution to 
(rural) poverty. The benefits are assumed to be: the creation 
of farm/off-farm job employment, the boosting of smallholder 
incomes, the transfer of needed technology, an increase 
in food production, the building-up of rural infrastructure, 
improved access to basic services, and the opening up of 
export opportunities. Attention is given to FPIC (free, prior, 
informed consent), full disclosure of relevant information,  
transparent transactions, as well as the technical efficiency 
and/or legal security of instruments such as registered 
land tenure rights (usually interpreted as individual private 
property rights), multi-stakeholder negotiations, written 
contracts, and state-civil society partnerships. Underpinning 
all this is a strident belief in a big corporate business driven 
and controlled development path.
The kind of corporate self-regulation proposed by the World 
Bank and others is a dangerous diversion from the real 
issues at hand with respect to land. It diverts attention from 
what is wrong with the economic development model it 
aspires to, and from the key role of land in the model. It also 
diverts our attention away from coming to terms with how 
rural poor people’s land (and water) rights, interests and 
concerns must be prioritised and promoted, and not just 
recognised and protected. 
The forces clamouring for such a solution today are the same 
ones that have been telling us for years that real redistributive 
land policies such as land reform and land restitution are 
impossible. They are now telling us that land grabbing is 
inevitable. Confronted by their ‘impossibility thesis’ on the one 
hand, and their ‘inevitability thesis’ on the other, we appear 
to have no choice but to resign ourselves and accept that a 
TNC-driven and controlled development path—and its view 
of rural poverty, land, and land rights—is the only one left. 
In our view, this kind of response to land grabbing is likely 
to facilitate, not block, further land grabbing and thus should 
not be considered, even as a second-best approach. Some 
may argue that the RAI, despite its inherent weaknesses, 
is the most pragmatic approach on the grounds that large-
scale land grabbing is inevitable in the current economic 
climate and political-institutional context. But land grabbing 
is not inevitable, and concerted efforts can and should be 
undertaken to stop it.
Local complexity
With this in mind, carefully analysing the views,  
strategies, and alternatives put forward by various 
quarters is crucial. All those who criticise big land deals 
do not necessarily share the same understandings of land 
grabbing, or of its implications in terms of immediate tasks 
and strategic alternatives. The differences in perspective 
can be class-based, as in the case of the (now defunct) 
International Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP) 
versus Via Campesina.4 Or, they can be ideological-
political, as in the case of Via Campesina versus that of the 
World Bank or IFPRI. Future research, policy-making, and 
political action around land issues are likely to be heavily 
influenced by the dynamics between these two currents. 
They are likely to pursue divergent research agendas, 
including the kinds of questions asked and methodologies 
used, and leading to competing sets of policy proposals 
and political action. 
At the same time, it is vital to see beyond polarised politics, 
and take stock of the heterogeneity of positions within the 
two poles, as well as the many shades of grey in between 
them. The same class-based and ideological fault-lines that 
separate IFAP and Via Campesina from each other are found 
(though to a lesser extent and intensity) within each camp 
too. Acknowledging diversity between and within various 
camps serves as an antidote to strong tendencies to over-
simplify positions in the emerging academic, policy and 
political discourse. 
4  Vía Campesina, an international movement of poor peasants and small farmers from the global South and North, was formally established in 1993 as a 
critical response to neoliberal globalisation, which was perceived by many other rural groups as a grave threat to their livelihoods. Today, this movement 
unites more than 100 national and sub-national organisations from Latin America, North America, Asia, the Caribbean, Africa, and Europe opposed to 
neoliberalism and advocating a pro-poor, sustainable, ‘rights-based’ rural development and greater democratisation. It is an ideologically autonomous 
and pluralist coalition. Claiming global and popular representation, although the American and European groups were the most numerous and influential 
within it at least during the first ten years or so, Vía Campesina has lately emerged as a major actor in the current popular transnational struggles against 
neoliberalism, demanding accountability from (inter)governmental agencies, rejecting neoliberal land policies, resisting and opposing corporate control over 
natural resources and technology, and advocating ‘food sovereignty’, among other issues.
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Varied viewpoints may be a reflection of the diversity of 
actual land tenure arrangements, land use, and land use 
change on the ground today. Such complexity can complicate 
political action. Devilish details in the nature, direction, pace, 
and extent of land use change  do not always fit easily 
into efforts to create simple clear messages for action. To 
illustrate, the popular focus on land use conversion from 
food production for consumption and local markets, to 
food and biofuel production for export, may inspire a lot of 
people to protest, but also ends up excluding a lot. More 
detailed mapping of patterns of land use change is needed. 
Mapping should take stock of variations in: the terms of rural 
working people’s insertion into the emerging food-biofuel 
agro-industrial complex; the broader context of food regimes 
(McMichael 2009); and the manner and effects of livelihood 
displacement, expulsion, and dispossession — whether driven 
by TNCs and foreign governments, and whether geared for 
export or not. Class analysis and a critical political economy 
framework are essential. 
This will require unpacking such stock phrases as ‘civil 
society’, ‘local community’ or ‘local people’. In many 
places ‘local community’ or ‘local people’ include kulaks, 
cacique, chiefs, landlords, traders, lumpen elements, and 
moneylenders – all of whom may favour a shift to industrial 
food-fuel production and commercial exchange, or to other 
related extractive activities; - in contrast to others in the 
community, including many small-scale producers and 
landless labourers. Local communities are differentiated 
by social class, ethnicity, and gender, among other fault-
lines, and have variable access to, control over, and use of 
land and water resources. (In this paper, we use the term 
‘rural working peoples’, loosely following the formulation on 
‘classes of labour’ by Bernstein (2010); we are aware of the 
populist connotation of the term ‘people’ and the problems 
that come with it.). Changes in land use and land property 
relations brought about by the renewed interest in land will 
have differentiated social, economic and political impacts. 
Understanding what is going on at the local level requires 
answering four key agrarian political economy questions, as 
explained by Bernstein (2010): Who owns what? Who does 
what? Who gets what? And what do they do with the surplus 
created?
The role of the State
In many instances, central states are engaged in systematic 
policy and administrative initiatives around the notion of 
‘available marginal lands’.  Their role in facilitating a certain 
kind of investment in these spaces includes: (i) invention/ 
justification, (ii) definition, reclassification, quantification, 
(iii) identification, (iv) acquisition/ appropriation and 
(v) re-allocation/ disposition of land. The basic aim is 
to transform ‘scarce’ land and associated resources 
— regardless of its actual ecological status or social 
character, and most of which fall formally under central 
state political-legal-military control – into productive factors 
of economic production.   
Stepping back, three distinct but interlinked dimensions of 
state action can be seen configuring contemporary land 
grabs. These are: (i) simplification of land-based social 
relations, (ii) the assertion of sovereignty and authority over 
territory, (iii) and the use of state-sanctioned armed force to 
ensure compliance, extend territorialisation, and broker for 
private capital accumulation (Scott 1998).
In order to administer and govern, states first engage 
in simplification techniques that render complex social 
processes more ‘legible’ to state field agents and 
bureaucrats. Cadastres (comprehensive land registries), 
land records and titles are mechanisms to simplify land-
based social relations that are otherwise too messy for 
state administration (Scott 1998). This is crucial in the 
construction of an official (e.g., authorized) land and land 
relations record. It is a key issue underlying today’s narrative 
of so-called available marginal or empty land and all too 
often involves, in effect, erasing (e.g., rendering ‘invisible’) 
evidence that societies and nature co-exist in these spaces.. 
The trend in state discourse around land grabs is: if the 
land is not formally privatized, then it is state-owned; if 
official census did not show significant formal settlements, 
then these are empty lands; if the same official census 
did not show significant farm production activities, then 
these are unused lands. Second, beyond the economic 
benefits of land investment, land deals are also viewed as 
an essential component of state-building processes where 
sovereignty and authority are extended to previously ‘non-
state spaces’ (Scott 1998). Third, coercion and violence 
are often used o by state police and (para)military forces 
to enforce compliance with the state simplification project, 
especially where people have refused to be erased by this 
“simplification” process. 
These three dimensions of state involvement in land deals 
are carried out to a large extent on behalf of the dominant 
classes of capital, foreign or domestic. However, state 
support for capital accumulation processes is constrained 
to some extent by the need to maintain at least a minimum 
degree of political legitimacy. Capital accumulation and 
political legitimation are inherently linked and contradictory, 
tension-filled, uneven and contested, across space and 
time (Fox 1993). This contradiction renders attempts at 
international governance of land grabbing a complicated 
undertaking, especially when it is the state that is grabbing 
land from the people. And yet, at the same time, under 
certain conditions, the contradiction makes possible some 
reformist concessions in favour of alternative (counter) 
claim-making ‘from below’.  
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Therefore instead of reproducing the neat and simplified 
presentation of land use by the state, it is crucial to 
understand the actual complexity and ‘messiness’ of existing 
land-based social relations and make that  the starting point 
of an alternative analysis and political action. A willingness 
to embrace complexity will allow us to engage with actual 
existing land-based social relations  and therefore allow a 
better grasp of the political dynamics associated with the 
nature, direction, pace, and extent of land property relations 
change as a result of big (trans)national land deals.
Looking back: limitations of demands  
for land reform
Land reform is an important rallying call by many organised 
movements of  rural working peoples today. And this is 
critical. Ultimately, land grabbing – even if we assume  that 
Oxfam’s high estimate of 227 million hectares of land is 
correct – constitutes a relatively small portion of the world’s 
agricultural land and agricultural population. Pre-existing land 
concentration outside the sites of current land grabbing has 
to be addressed with the same urgency. Here, redistributive 
land policies such as land reform remain the most potent 
policy option. 
But whether land reform is the appropriate ‘umbrella 
demand’ in global land struggles,  is quite another matter. 
In our view, certain old and new realities have weakened 
the potential impact and effectiveness of demands for land 
reform. For instance, contemporary land grabbing activities 
are being carried out, or planned, in many places where land 
reforms have already been carried out in the past, including 
Brazil, Mozambique, Philippines and India. Conventional 
land reform alone cannot therefore be the solution to land 
grabbing in these situations. Conventional land reform 
is taken to mean what Griffin et al (2002, 279–80) have 
defined as: redistributing “land ownership from large 
private landowners to small peasant farmers and landless 
agricultural workers,” emphasising that it is “concerned with 
a redistribution of wealth.” The bias is towards redistribution 
of formally privatised large tracts of land, such as Latin 
America’s latifundia. This is the strength of land reform, 
but also its weakness. Most agricultural land in the world 
has non-private (state, public, communal, common, and so 
on) institutional property arrangements. Much of the land 
targeted by land grabbing are non-private and therefore 
outside the limits of conventional land reform. In this specific 
context, the conventional land reform demand lacks analytical 
and political power.
Moreover, the problem of land grabbing and land 
concentration is not confined to the South where the 
demand for land reform is a partly reasonable master frame 
for campaigns. The problem of land grabbing and land 
concentration is just as creeping and complex in the North. 
But framing a campaign demand around land reform in the 
Northern context is a non-starter: a  ‘land reform’ campaign 
in  21st century Europe and North America may be a 
conceptually defensible idea, but it is politically problematic as 
the broader public is unlikely to comprehend its logic.  
In addition, many of the sites of contemporary land grabs 
are in the territories of indigenous communities where social 
relations of property and concept of property rights are 
significantly different from the non-indigenous communities. 
Land reform is generally understood as framing land as a 
resource, an economic factor of production that needs to be 
distributed more fairly. Yet indigenous peoples do not view 
land simply as a resource that can be valued monetarily and 
can be exploited purely for production and/or extraction – 
but as a territory for their reproduction as peoples, which 
is one reason why historically there have been some 
tensions between land reform movements and indigenous 
communities. 
In many ways, the conventional land reform framework 
internalises the problems of state land policy, avoiding 
complex land-based social relations and relying on standard 
measures of land property relations. As a result it misses 
a lot of land concentration not captured in official records, 
but which should be the object of redistributive reform. This 
limitation becomes even more deeply problematic in today’s 
conjuncture, especially because the non-private (‘public 
lands’) have become the principal target of enclosure. 
Some of the points above have been recognised by social 
movements. Some groups use the term ‘land reform’ 
implicitly to mean more than just large private landholdings 
(e.g., to include state/ public land) and more than just having 
one’s physical possession recognized as legitimate (e.g., to 
include recognising as legitimate one’s power to decide how 
the land will be used). For example, Via Campesina (2008: 
10) explained:
“We will fight for a comprehensive genuine agrarian 
reform that upholds the rights of women, indigenous 
peoples, peasants, fisherfolk, workers, pastoralists, 
migrants and future generations and enables 
the coexistence of different communities in their 
territories. Customary rights to territory must be 
recognized but must be adapted if they discriminate 
against women or marginalized communities. 
Agrarian reform must ensure priority in the use 
of land, water, seeds and livestock breeds, etc. for 
food production and other local needs rather than 
production for export” (Via Campesina, 2008: 10).
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But the ambiguity remains, potentially obscuring what is 
meant and possibly blunting campaign and lobby work. Apart 
from the lack of consensus on what land reform means, there 
are also problems inherent to land reform in the conventional 
sense. One such problem is, as pointed out earlier, the state’s 
compulsion to always simplify—‘make legible’—complex and 
dynamic land-based social relations, as part of the logic of 
modern state-building. Conventional land policy processes 
are more attuned to ‘things’ (e.g., papers, title deeds), even 
when these do not conform to the realities actually existing 
on the ground (Tsing 2002). To conclude, therefore, while it 
is relevant and important in certain situations, the limitations 
of conventional land reform hinder its ability to serve as 
the counter-policy framework unambiguously capable of 
prioritising and promoting the land rights of the rural working 
poor classes across the North-South hemispheres.
Limitations to demands for ‘land security’
Another response to today’s cycle of land grabbing has 
been  a growing call by many groups  for greater land tenure 
security. It is based on a simple assumption: people are 
dispossessed because they do not have formal property 
rights over their land; and so, the policy response should be 
to provide land tenure security to these people. 
At first glance this more recent call appears to be quite 
appropriate to present-day conditions. Yet here too a 
critical historical perspective on land issues and land policy 
frameworks is needed. In the land policy literature ‘security’ 
means providing, promoting and/or protecting the property 
rights of the exclusive owners and/or users of land; it 
usually means individual and private rights including the 
right to alienate. It means the commodification of land, and 
transforming it into something marketable. Titles are the chief 
expression of this so-called security. These interpretations 
reinforce the conservative view of land as a ‘thing’ with only 
economic use-value. But an even deeper problem with the 
notion of ‘security’ is that it can mean anything – whether 
legitimate or not, whether truly pro-poor or not.
Land tenure security can mean the property security of big 
landlords living in the capital city and relying on tenants or 
farm workers to make the land productive. It can also mean 
the property security of corrupt government officials, who 
may have made claims over vast tracts of far-flung public 
land through anomalous deals and for speculative purposes. 
Security in land property can also mean security of the banks 
that are selling capital for profit, and need collateral in case of 
payment default. In the current context of global land grabbing 
‘security’ can, and in fact does always also, refer to the se-
curity of (trans)national capital invested in land, for example, 
secure property rights to allow for a secure 99 year lease or 
indeed an outright sale. In fact, in the mainstream economic 
discourse security around land property almost always means 
the security of elite owners or elite claimants, most of whom 
are absentee and using the land for purposes that have noth-
ing to do with the broader social well-being of the rural work-
ing poor majority. It may not be an exaggeration to say that 
the term ‘land tenure security’ has been captured to such a 
degree by elite state and social forces and institutions, that it 
has largely lost any previous pro-poor connotation.
Land sovereignty
In light of these problems, but without giving up the positive 
core ideals found in the concepts of land reform and land 
tenure security, we propose a shift in framework from ‘land 
reform’ and ‘land tenure security’, to ‘land sovereignty’. 
Taking seriously the historic demands for land by the various 
strata of working peoples, what is needed is an alternative 
frame that better expresses a truly pro-working poor class 
bias in land issues – especially the core idea of the rural 
working classes being able to exercise full and effective 
control over the land where they live and work. While every 
term including ‘land sovereignty’ will have its limitations, 
we believe ‘land sovereignty’ can perhaps best capture the 
essence of the demand for land by rural working peoples.
The term connotes a sense of ‘belongingness’: the land 
belongs to the people who work it, care for it and live on it, 
and, the people belong to a particular land as a people. It also 
should remind us that individual and collective plots of land 
are part of larger socially constructed landscapes and water-
scapes, which in turn reflect the kind of relationship between 
human societies and the environment that has emerged over 
time in a given place, and should push us to always strive for 
an ecologically healthy relationship with our environment. The 
issues of space, ecology, territory, identity, and belonging-
ness—key dimensions of a truly pro-poor and sustainable 
conception of and demand for land that can be prioritszed 
and promoted into the future—can be better captured in the 
notion of land sovereignty.
For us, land sovereignty is the right of working peoples to 
have effective access to, use of, and control over land and the 
benefits of its use and occupation, where land is understood 
as resource, territory, and landscape. Simply put, land 
sovereignty is the realisation of the working peoples’ human 
right to land. The use of the term ‘sovereignty’ perhaps 
sounds awkward. But we go with it here provisionally for 
lack of a better term in order to try to capture the essence of 
‘working peoples’ effective access, control and use’ as well 
as a phrase that could naturally be linked to an emerging 
broader alternative development framework, namely, ‘food 
sovereignty’ (Martinez-Torres and Rosset, 2010). 
A ‘Land Sovereignty’ Alternative? Towards a Peoples’ Counter-Enclosure
7
As we use it here, ‘sovereignty’ has a dual meaning. On the 
one hand, it is a call to action to bring the state back in and 
hold it accountable to citizens amidst a renewed corporate 
and transnational global assault on the agrarian front in the 
form of (trans)national enclosures. This approach must of 
course address the problems of a state-centric land policy 
framework. On the other hand, it is a support to working 
peoples and their human right to control over land as 
resources, territory and landscapes. It is in part a response 
to the recent popular calls to preserve and protect the 
commons. Similarly this approach must address the problems 
in commons-oriented and community-centric (populist) 
frameworks that tend to de-emphasise intra-community 
class and group differentiation, among others. By building on 
the strengths of both state-centric and community-oriented 
perspectives, it may be possible to address some of the key 
weaknesses of each.
There are five reasons why land sovereignty is a useful 
normative framework. First, in terms of systems of property 
rights, it accepts that these can be plural – encompassing 
communal, community, state, and/or private property rights. 
Land sovereignty does not privilege western private property 
rights, but it also does not reject them. It gives premium to 
preserving and protecting the remaining commons, but also 
does not romanticise this, especially since these are also sites 
of intra-community exploitation. It recognises the importance 
of state property as an alternative to full-scale individualised 
and privatised property rights, but is also cognisant of the 
contradictory role of the state in terms of contestations 
around control over land resources and their use, and the 
dangers of its simplification processes.
Second, in terms of public policy options, land sovereignty 
builds on, and so privileges redistributive land reform, but 
then goes beyond it too. It looks at land reform as a key 
policy demand and instrument in places where a western 
property rights regime has been entrenched resulting in land 
concentration. But it is conscious of the limits of land reform. 
Therefore, land sovereignty brings into play other equally 
important redistributive land policies, including land restitution 
especially in places where people were displaced and 
dispossessed by earlier and current waves of land grabbing. 
The redistributive character and content of a land policy is 
not automatically defined and delivered by the particular type 
or form of a policy: there are redistributive land reforms, 
but there are conservative pro-elite land reforms (think 
of market-assisted land reform), and so on; the content 
and character are partly shaped by state-society political 
contestations. So we can also include a variety of other land 
policies whose redistributive content can be shaped and 
secured through mass struggles: e.g. forest land reallocation 
policies, community-based forest management, tenure 
reform, leasehold reform.
Third, land sovereignty necessary takes on board the land-
as-a-resource focus of land reform, builds on it, and then 
goes beyond it to include two other master narratives: 
land as territory and as landscapes. By doing so, land 
sovereignty is a framework that does not back away from 
existing tensions between competing narratives, but actually 
confronts them. Indigenous peoples communities and 
movements worldwide seldom and  rarely use ‘land reform’ 
as their framework of struggle, as they aspire to control their 
‘territory’. Moreover, land reform was and is a divisive policy 
frame in particular settings, especially where there are large 
numbers of rural labourers working either for smallholders 
themselves or for large farms. A land reform framework 
for a land campaign necessarily alienates many of these 
labourers, many of whom would not even want to become 
peasants. But they may have a place-based land issue – 
where land is cast as a territory or landscape; labourers may 
demand not farm plots but house lots, for example. Finally, 
there are small family farmers who already have their plots 
of land and so would not see a call for land reform as an 
issue for them. And yet, they may have persistent land 
issues as well, which become more visible when land is cast 
broadly as territory and landscapes. Land sovereignty can 
thus be a common platform between peasants, labourers 
and indigenous peoples.
Fourth, in terms of positioning mass struggles from below, 
land sovereignty can provide a more inclusive, global master 
frame than land reform does. Cast broadly, as explained 
above, land sovereignty can serve as an overarching narrative 
that can bring together – as fellow claim-makers – social 
movements from the South and North, from rural and 
urban settings. This may resolve the problem inherent in an 
international land reform campaign that is too South- and 
rural-centred. Resolving these divides perceptible in the Via 
Campesina-led global campaign for agrarian reform can 
unleash a massive global political force worldwide: South-
North, rural-urban. Imagine a shared land campaign demand 
that brings together  peasants from Mali, forest dwellers from 
Indonesia, peasants from Guatemala, part-time small family 
farm in France, and an urban gardener in Detroit. This is 
a broad coalition that is inconceivable within a land reform 
master frame.
Fifth, an inclusive global land struggle can be effective only 
when cast not as a stand- alone issue and campaign, but 
one that is able to connect, and connect well, with broader 
working peoples’ campaigns and political projects. Land alone 
does not constitute an alternative model of development; it is 
a necessary component of the latter. The current alternative 
narrative that has inspired tens of thousands of working 
peoples, middle classes, intellectuals and activists worldwide, 
both urban- and rural-based, young and old, is food sover-
eignty. Food sovereignty needs a land pillar, but land reform 
A ‘Land Sovereignty’ Alternative? Towards a Peoples’ Counter-Enclosure
8
cannot be this pillar; conversely, land sovereignty needs a 
broader master frame. In this context, land sovereignty will 
be able to connect well with food sovereignty – allowing for 
a mutually reinforcing, synergistic interaction between these 
two frameworks and the social movements therein. But this 
means too that land sovereignty is necessarily a cross-class 
alliance and political project – in the same manner as food 
sovereignty; thereby internalising both synergy and tension in 
these kind of alliances and political projects.
Land sovereignty: defending against  
elite and corporate enclosure
There is an ongoing worldwide corporate-led, state-brokered 
enclosure process, occurring in the South and North, rural 
and urban. It is being resisted – albeit weakly and unevenly – 
in these various sites of struggle. These enclosures affect in 
a variety of ways multiple social classes and groups. A cross-
class, peoples’ counter-enclosure campaign has become 
urgent and necessary, and has been underway  despite 
lacking an overarching master frame.  
A people’s counter-enclosure campaign is one where the 
working peoples resist political processes that maintain 
inequitable status quo or even further (re)concentrate land 
ownership and control . In the specific current international 
context, it is a campaign where people struggle to resist 
(trans)national landgrabbers.
Campaign against non-redistributive land policies
The defining character of  non-redistributive land policy is the 
maintenance of the status quo, usually marked by land-based 
inequity and exclusion, such as the existence of latifundia 
in Latin America, or state monopoly in land as in Indonesia. 
Here, the most typical land policy is ‘no land policy’.  In 
settings where there are vast land-based inequities and 
exclusion, a ‘no land policy, policy’ effectively advocates for 
non-redistribution of land-based wealth and power. In other 
settings, a similar effect is created by having a land policy, 
even a redistributive land reform policy, but then keeping this 
dormant. The existence of this type of land policy favours 
and facilitates (trans)national land grabbing. However, there 
are also active land policies that are categorically non-(re)
distributive.
Formalisation of inequality occurs in agrarian societies 
marked by socio-economic inequality and lopsided power 
relations between various groups and classes in society, 
where a technical ‘formalisation’ of land rights  is carried 
out. Formalising land rights of legal claimants in settings 
marked by a high degree of inequality is likely to formalise 
land claims by elite claimants, or indeed, by the state. In such 
cases, formalisation policies have only formalised inequality 
and institutionalised historical injustice. Many earlier private 
land-titling programs, carried out by former colonial powers, 
dispossessed the local population and facilitated land 
grabbing by colonisers. Formal land rights do not guarantee 
protection of land rights for the rural poors. The Land Law 
of 1997 in Mozambique guarantees land rights of local 
communities; yet the same law was used by transnational 
large-scale land investors to secure large chunks of lands for 
their investments, displacing, and even dispossessing many 
of the local population in the process.
Restitution without redistribution happens when large scale 
land-based wealth and power transfers are carried out in 
the name of the poor, who in reality have no significant 
effective access to, or control over land resources that 
are transferred. Examples of this include post-conflict 
situations where land restitutions were carried out through 
large chunks of land being awarded to communities or 
the state, without any process of democratising access 
to and control over these land resource. Many civil wars 
were partly caused by struggles to control land resources 
or territories. Therefore, many peace settlements have 
included land policies. However, redistributive reforms in land 
seldom figure in peace settlements, partly because on many 
occasions forces opposed to any redistributive perspective 
in land policies are located in the warring factions. In cases 
where democratisation of land was attempted in the peace 
settlement process, the kinds of land policies adopted were 
too market-friendly, as in Central America in the mid-1990s, 
and the 1980 Zimbabwe peace settlement. As a result, 
policies benefited the elite and the central state more than  
working peoples.
Campaign against (re)concentration
The defining character of (re)concentration is when land-
based wealth and power transfers do occur, yet access 
to and control over the land resource actually gets (re)
concentrated in the hands of the economically and 
politically dominant social classes and groups: landed 
classes, capitalists, corporate entities, state or other 
dominant community groups such as village chiefs. This 
kind of change can occur in private or public lands. The 
organisation of control over land resources can be through 
individual, corporate, state, or community group institutional 
arrangements in property rights. The transfer may involve 
full land ownership or not. Different variations are possible, 
but the bottom line is the same: the recipients of land-
based wealth and power transfers are the economically and 
politically dominant social classes and groups, as well as 
state officials and bureaucrats.
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There are at least three broad trajectories within the (re)
concentration category. Reverse redistribution is where 
redistributed land-based wealth and power (from the 
landed classes or the state to the working poor) was later 
redistributed back to the landed classes, other elites or 
the state. In the current context of global land grabbing, 
an example is the 30,000 hectares of Procana sugarcane 
plantation in the Gaza province of Mozambique where the 
local population, beneficiaries of previous land reform, 
were displaced to pave the way for the plantation. Perverse 
redistribution is a trajectory where land-based wealth and 
power are transferred from the working poor people to the 
economically and politically dominant classes and groups, 
as well as state officials and bureaucrats. This can happen 
under a variety of policies, including notionally pro-poor 
policies such as land reform and forest land allocation 
or management devolution, and via formalisation and 
privatisation of land rights, a variety of land-based joint 
venture agreements, and land lease arrangements, and so 
on. Examples of this are plenty in the current context of 
global land grabbing: in Cambodia previously farmed and 
occupied lands were suddenly appropriated by the state for 
reallocation to domestic and transnational investors. Lopsided 
distribution is where land-based wealth and power are 
transferred from the state or community, directly or indirectly, 
by policy or through the open market, to a handful of private 
or state entities, with the net effect of excluding others while 
benefiting a few.The way state lands are being reallocated 
by the Indonesian state to private corporations represents a 
good example of this type which has been done in order to  
facilitate the rapid expansion of oil palm in that country.
These latter two types of land policies—non-(re)distribution 
and (re)concentration—undermine the  livelihood  of  working 
peoples in a variety of ways. In many cases, these policies 
lead to dispossession of the rural poor, in others these lead 
to working people’s adverse incorporation into enclaves of 
corporate-controlled plantations. These policies are being 
opposed, in various ways and extents—by rural working 
peoples: from organised to unorganised, overt to covert, legal 
to extralegal, and from local to transnational arenas of political 
contestations. The working peoples’ counter-enclosure 
campaign is a defensive struggle. It is a critical component 
of land sovereignty campaign, but represents only half the 
picture on the agrarian battle front today; the other half is a 
more pro-active campaign, the people’s enclosure campaign.
Land sovereignty: fighting for  people’s 
enclosure campaign
A pro-active peoples’ campaign is just as important as a 
defensive struggle. A people’s counter-enclosure campaign is 
necessary but not sufficient;  a peoples’ enclosure campaign 
is necessary. 
A peoples’ enclosure campaign is one where working 
peoples pro-actively assert their political control over their 
remaining lands against potential and actual threats of 
corporate or state enclosure. It is one that can be done either 
independently from the central state via community-based 
enclosure of the commons or in direct engagement with 
the state. Here, we will focus on the latter type. There are 
two types of land policy institutional contexts within which 
peoples’ enclosure campaign can, and should, take place 
namely, redistributive and distributive land policies.
The defining principle for redistributive land policy is that 
the land-based wealth and power are transferred from the 
monopoly control of either private landed classes, or the state 
to landless and near-landless working peoples. It changes 
the relative shares of social classes and groups in society. It 
is a ‘zero-sum’ reform process. The conventional notion of 
redistributive land reform, applied only to large private lands, 
is the most commonly understood example of land-based 
redistributive reform. However, we argue that there are a 
variety of policy expressions, beyond the conventional notion, 
that can result in changing the relative shares of  social 
classes and groups in society. These include redistributive 
land reform, land restitution, share tenancy or land tenure 
reform, land stewardship, indigenous land rights recognition, 
and labour reform. This is regardless of whether a policy is 
applied to a private or public land. The key is to be able to 
establish the degree of redistributed wealth and power, and 
to which direction.
The basic defining character of  distributive land policy 
reform is that the landless and near-landless working 
peoples are the recipients of land-based wealth and power . 
However, the original source of wealth and power can either 
be the state or community, or a private entity that has been 
fully compensated by the state. In many settings, this type 
of reform would mean affirming and protecting pre-existing 
land access and occupancy by poor peasants, whose tenure 
is insecure. It is a ‘positive sum’ reform process. It does not 
take resources from one social class or group in society to 
redistribute to another. In fact, often such a policy is passed 
precisely to avoid having to resort to redistributive policies 
(Fox 1993: 10). For example, a piece of land that is officially 
categorised as public or state forest is actually an agroforest 
land tended and tilled by poor peasants or forest dwellers. A 
long-term forest land use rights allocation was issued to the 
poor peasants and forest dwellers in order to make their pre-
existing access to the forest land more formal and secure. 
This is a distributive reform.
A peoples’ enclosure campaign advocating for redistributive 
and distributive land policies can be carried out through at 
least three broad strategies, namely, state-centric, social 
movement or community-led, and state/community-driven. It 
is not about the mere presence or absence of either the state 
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or community entity that defines these types of strategies, 
Rather, it is the character and the extent to which each actor 
plays a key role that is important.
State-centric. Historically, the most sweeping (re)
distributive land reforms were state-driven. As the examples 
show, successful and significant land reforms were carried 
out by the central state not only in the context of socialist 
transitions, but also in non-socialist contexts. The central 
state has played a key and leading role in these sweeping 
social justice redistributive land reforms. It does not mean 
to say that other non-state actors were absent or did 
not play any significant role. They did; but the role of the 
central state was the key. State-centric (re)distributive 
land policies occurred not only in the form of conventional 
land reforms, but also in other redistributive land policies, 
such as forest land (re)allocation policies. A variety of land 
restitution experiences have also been  carried out through 
time, although with limited success. One of the lessons 
here is that wherever possible and appropriate, state-driven 
redistributive land reforms should be seriously considered 
and implemented—and should never be dismissed a priori. 
It remains one of the most important policy options for 
redistributive land policies today, because the central state 
has the power to make authoritative decisions in society 
on some important laws and programs. It has the coercive 
apparatus that can be deployed in pursuit of  working 
peoples’ interests.
Social movement or community-led. These two 
subtypes are very similar, and yet significantly different too. 
The more mainstream version of them is the community-
led strategy. In fact the same term is used to clothe a 
straightforward market-led land policy. What we mean 
here by community-led are those pushing for a truly 
redistributive land policy—land reform, land restitution, 
community-based forest management, and so on—where 
community organisations in their variety of forms such 
as production cooperatives, neighbourhood associations, 
village committees, and so on, have taken the lead role 
in pushing for a redistributive land policy process and 
outcome. This remains a viable and desirable option 
especially in settings where there are no highly organized 
rural social movements. However, it is critical to always 
disaggregate ‘communities’, analytically and politically, 
based on the multiple fault-lines that exist within these 
communities: class, gender, and ethnicity, among others. 
Meanwhile, the more popular and dramatic version of this 
type is the social movement-led strategy. Here, we refer to 
highly organized rural social movements that are engaged 
in contentious politics with the state for redistributive land 
reform. We see this either at a national scale or at a local 
scale. At the national scale, perhaps the best known social 
movement-led strategy for redistributive land reform is  
in Brazil. There, the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem 
Terra (MST) and other militant agrarian movements, both 
within and outside La Via Campesina-Brazil—have used 
the strategy of land occupation to interpret and implement 
the state land reform law. Over time, these movements 
were able to resettle hundreds of thousands of landless 
households. However, such a model is rare, t. It is also 
not easily replicable or quickly exportable. The more 
widespread type within this category are subnational social 
movementss. By disaggregating the concept of social 
movement-led strategies for redistributive land policies, 
we avoid dismissing the relevance and importance of 
many other existing subnational movements that have 
carried out, or have attempted to carry out, redistributive 
land policies with varying degrees and extent of success 
that are just as politically profound as the more dramatic 
national cases. Contemporary examples include land 
occupation initiatives in Indonesia where peasants have 
mobilized around the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 to seize 
and occupy lands in different parts of the country, the 
Chiapas struggle for land in Mexico, and the ‘village land 
banks’ initiative by peasants and indigenous communities 
in northeast Thailand. The social movement/community-
led redistributive land policy strategies are just one of the 
three broad types of redistributive alternatives, but  tend 
to receive the most attention from the broad community 
of academics and activists, perhaps largely because 
of its more dramatic forms of actions. But as we have 
pointed out, the latter is just one of the many redistributive 
alternatives, and also the rarest, and most difficult to 
replicate in the current political economic context.
State/social movements, state/community-driven.  
The least popular and least understood type of 
redistributive alternatives are the state/community- or 
state/social movement-driven strategies for redistributive 
land policies. There are important lessons and experiences 
in the past, and currently that show how and when a state/
community or state/social movement-driven process 
resulted in desirable pro-poor outcomes. This category is 
somewhat a combination of the first two types described 
above: both state and non-state actors have played more 
or less equally significant roles in a symbiotic way. There 
are two sub-types: state/community and state/social 
movement-driven; the difference between the two is similar 
to the earlier discussion on community and movement-
led land policies. When mobilisations from below are met 
by actions from above, more radical state land reform 
laws can be carried out. This was what happened in the 
Philippines during the limited period from 1992 to 2000, 
more or less what transpired during the Sandinista land 
reform in the 1980s, during the Allende reforms in the early 
1970s in Chile, as well as in Kerala in the 19760s-1970s. 
This was the same process in West Bengal’s share 
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tenancy reform in the 1970s and onwards. There are also 
several cases of successful subnational, localized state/
community-driven community forest land reallocation and 
management, community mapping, and land restitution in 
various parts of the world. The state/community and state/
social movement-driven strategy is an important alternative 
for realising redistributive land policy changes  especially 
in places where the state on its own is unable to overcome 
structural and institutional obstacles to reform, or in 
settings where powerful national social movements do not 
exist. Combining the limited forces of state and societal 
actors becomes central to any redistributive alternative.
Concluding remarks
Our main intention in this discussion paper has been to help 
raise critical questions about the strengths and limitations 
of current analytical and political frameworks that inform 
current land reform campaigns by agrarian movements and 
their allies. We do not offer any firm answers to many of the 
questions, but we put forward some propositions, cast in a 
normative way, for  discussion on how to   frame and mount 
cross-class peoples’ campaigns against land dispossession 
and for (re)possession – both defensive and pro-active mass 
struggles. 
We offer an initial and ipreliminary discussion about the 
concept of land sovereignty: why we need to transition  
people’s demands from ‘land reform’ and ‘land tenure 
security’ to land sovereignty. In our concept, land sovereignty 
is anchored on two inseparable pillars of sovereignty: state 
and people. We also explain why and how land sovereignty 
is an alternative analytical framework that can help us 
understand better the complexity of land issues in the current 
context and that can serve as an alternative political platform 
to help us confront more inclusively and effectively the 
challenges confronting us on the global land and agrarian 
fronts today. Land sovereignty as a campaign thus represents 
two politically intertwined struggles of rural working people: 
their defensive struggle—the peoples’ counter-enclosure 
campaign and their pro-active struggle—the peoples’ 
enclosure campaign. 
In a way land sovereignty is inspired by the relative success 
of food sovereignty as a framework for an alternative model 
for food production and consumption, a campaign and a 
movement. Food sovereignty has become a global framework 
for all those who are confronted by a ‘food question’, whether 
they are in  rural or urban areas, in the South or North. It is a 
concept that is flexibly interpreted and carried out depending 
on one’s structural and institutional location and has become  
a truly cross class alliance political project. 
What we urgently need now is a framework for our global 
land campaign that has a similar impact, i.e. a framework 
with which all those who are confronted by a land question, 
whether they are in urban or rural areas, or in the South 
or North can identify with; a framework that can be flexibly 
interpreted across structural and institutional settings. It 
in this context that we put forward the concept of ‘land 
sovereignty’ as a possible agenda for discussion.
The content of this Publication maybe quoted or reproduced provided that the source is acknowledged. Transnational Institute would appreciate 
receiving a copy of the document in which the publication is cited.
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AGRARIAn JuSTICE PRoGRAmmE
In recent years, various  actors, from big foreign 
and domestic corporate business and finance to 
governments,  have initiated a large-scale worldwide 
enclosure of agricultural lands, mostly in the Global 
South but also elsewhere. This is done for large-scale 
industrial and industrial agriculture ventures and 
often packaged as large-scale investment for rural 
development. But rather than being investment that is 
going to benefit the majority of rural people, especially 
the poorest and most vulnerable, this process 
constitutes a new wave of land and water ‘grabbing’. 
It is a global phenomenon whereby the access, use 
and right to land and other closely associated natural 
resources is being taken over - on a large-scale  
and/or by large-scale capital – resulting in a cascade 
of negative impacts on rural livelihoods and ecologies, 
human rights, and local food security. 
In this context TNI aims to contribute to strengthening 
the campaigns by agrarian social movements in order 
to make them more effective in resisting land and 
water grabbing; and in developing and advancing 
alternatives such as land/food/water sovereignty  
and agro-ecological farming systems.
